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Hobbes on Magnanimity and Statesmanship: 
Replacing Virtue with Science 
Geoffrey M. Vaughan 
At  first glance we might think that Hobbes had no use lor either magnanim­
ity or statesmanship. How could either fit into his commonwealth, that great 
Leviathan, king over the children of pride? The word "statesman" or "states­
manship" appears, as far as I can tell, in only two passages of Behemoth, nei­
ther very significant.1 Magnanimity, for its part, is defined in Leviathan as 
merely "contempt of little helps and hindrances."2 A fellow Oxfordian would 
later describe Aristotle's magnanimous man in terms Hobbes might have ap­
proved as "a prig with the conceit and bad manners of a prig."3 It would be 
easy to conclude that he considered neither magnanimity nor statesmanship 
to be worthy subjects of study. We might even go so far as to suggest that they 
are not worthy of emulation, leading as they might to vainglory and the pre­
sumptions that lead to civil war. 
It is certainly true that Hobbes had scientific pretensions for his political 
theory, and this topic has been ably covered by scholars.4 But it is also the 
case that he introduced his masterwork, Leviathan, with a letter extolling the 
virtues of his deceased friend, Sidney Godolphin. Hobbes was not insensitive 
to virtue and virtuous men. But neither was he unrealistic about such men. 
Sidney died early in the civil war, thus rendering his virtues inaccessible to 
the royalist cause, and Francis, his brother and the man to whom Leviathan is 
dedicated, turned the Scilly Islands over to the Commonwealth in 1646. 
Whatever virtues these brothers possessed and however highly Hobbes might 
have thought of them, their virtues did little good because they were so un­
usual and short-lived. The reason such virtues are unavailing is to be found in 
his account of the only two things that can induce men to keep their 
covenants: "And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their 
word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to break it. This later is a 
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Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of 
Wealth, Command, or sensual! Pleasure; which are the greatest part of 
Mankind."5 The Godolphin brothers—or at least Sidney—might have kept 
their word from a generosity of spirit, but such a rare quality is not solid 
enough ground for erecting civil society. 
The advantage of paying attention to magnanimity and statesmanship in 
the thought of Thomas Hobbes is that it allows us to see the extent to which 
his arguments in Leviathan and elsewhere develop what is, for him, a subop-
timal answer to the questions he sought to address in his work. I s hall argue 
that Hobbes could treat these topics lightly only after regretfully acknowl­
edging that his preferred solution, which would involve both, is unworkable. 
And it i s the impracticality of relying on magnanimity and statesmanship that 
led Hobbes to develop the arguments that he did, the arguments that do not 
rely on either. 
MAGNAN I M I TY AND STATESM ANSHIP  
Before we explore the various ways that magnanimity and statesmanship play 
out in Hobbes's political theory, we ought first to consider how he understood 
each of these terms. Again, the biggest obstacle to this is his infrequent use of 
these terms and short attention to these concepts. Nevertheless there is cer­
tainly enough for us to go on at this point. 
Taking magnanimity first, we can be grateful for the fact that Hobbes did 
indeed define the term for us. The first mention of magnanimity in Leviathan, 
however, is not its definition. Rather, Hobbes offered it as an example of the 
ways in which names can not be the true grounds of any ratiocination. Ac­
cording to Hobbes, one man will call prodigality what another will call mag­
nanimity, as one will call gravity what another would call stupidity.6 When we 
come to the definition of magnanimity we find, as noted above, that it is con­
tempt of little helps and hindrances. This arises as part of a description of the 
various passions which, in the work of other authors, would be called virtues. 
In Hobbes's account, not only are they passions, but magnanimity merely 
falls in his list between pusillanimity and kindness.7 He further refined the 
definition by offering us two different sorts of magnanimity. The first, which 
is to be found in the face of physical danger, he defined as valor or fortitude. 
The second type of magnanimity arises in the use of riches and is called lib­
erality. 
These first occurrences of magnanimity in Leviathan do not seem very 
promising. The warnings regarding the use of names may be useful, but there 
is nothing to suggest that his choice of terms had special significance. Quentin 
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Skinner, however, has taken the trouble to compare Hobbes's warnings about 
the use of names to his earlier list in The Elements of Law. Almost all the terms 
changed in Leviathan. The only pair that even resembles the earlier list is 
prodigality:magnanimity, which earlier appeared as liberality.prodigality.8 
What is especially curious is that "prodigality" nowhere else appears in 
Leviathan and is not listed among the passions in chapter 6. Indeed, there 
seems to be no description of excessive spending, even though Hobbes offers 
three different words for its opposite. And yet this word is the one that he uses 
in both lists. It is curious that Hobbes consistently warned that magnanimity or 
one of its variants could be perniciously misused in a rhetorical struggle, even 
as he used it repeatedly. 
The definition of magnanimity and its two variants is also disappointing, 
for "greatness of soul" is reduced to a contempt for something bad rather than 
an attraction to or pursuit of something good. In keeping with its status as a 
passion it is little more than an aversion.9 Moreover, the definitions of valor 
and liberality ring a little hollow. How does a contempt for "little helps, and 
hindrances" translate into valorous actions in the face of death? Compare this 
to Aristotle's account: "Still, nobility shines through even in such circum­
stances, when a man bears many great misfortunes with good grace not be­
cause he is insensitive to pain but because he is noble and high-minded 
[megalopsuchos]."10 There is an incommensurability between, on the one 
hand, a passion that disdains pettiness and, on the other, those actions that we 
might associate with valor. Liberality is not much better explained by this 
contempt for little helps and hindrances." Far more than define these terms 
what Hobbes seems to do here was define them away. What would otherwise 
be understood as the virtues of magnanimity, valor or fortitude, and liberality 
are presented in Leviathan not only as passions, rather than virtues, but as mi­
nor passions. Reducing courage to the hope of avoiding hurt by resistance as 
he also did is certainly commensurate with this general diminution of the 
virtues.12 
A further and significant refinement arises two chapters later, in chapter 8, 
where magnanimity is now defined as "contempt ol unjust or dishonest 
helps."13 The curious shift here is from little to unjust or dishonest. What 
would account for the sudden moral content of magnanimity? This refined 
definition of magnanimity arises in the context of Hobbes's definition and ac­
count of the intellectual virtues, specifically prudence. He explained that the 
prudence that uses unjust and dishonest means is "that Crooked Wisdom, 
which is called CRAFT; which is a sign of Pusillanimity." Thus, however pru­
dent it may be to turn to injustice and dishonesty, the magnanimous man will 
not do so. But why not? If dishonesty were to be a great rather than a little 
help, why would the magnanimous man continue to contemn it? Only a few 
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chapters later Hobbes will tell us that "Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two 
Cardinal vertues."14 The refinement raises more problems than it answers. 
Thereafter, in the four other mentions of magnanimity to be found in 
Leviathan, it is understood in relation to the display or acquisition of power. 
For instance, on one and the same page magnanimity is said to be both con­
sciousness of power and a sign of power.15 In other words, while on the one 
hand it arises from self-knowledge and self-reflection, it is also a signal to 
others. Following upon the second, we find in chapter 14 that actions can be 
undertaken for the purpose of gaining a reputation for magnanimity. One 
would apparently so want such a reputation that Hobbes even said rights 
would be transferred without reciprocation.16 And we find, in the final men­
tion of magnanimity, that if not magnanimity itself at least its effects are hon­
orable by nature. 
So where does Hobbes stand on the topic of magnanimity? Is it good or 
bad? On the one hand it would seem to be good, for the magnanimous man 
disdains injustice and that would be good for the commonwealth. On the 
other hand, of course, both the awareness of power that leads to magnani­
mous actions and the desire for power that does the same involves a subject 
in the very type of contest that destabilizes the commonwealth and can lead 
to civil war. As much as having power leads to magnanimity, a reputation for 
magnanimity through repeated magnanimous actions can produce power 
where none or little existed before. For, as Hobbes tells us, a reputation for 
power is power.17 And, as any student of Hobbes can explain, for anyone 
other than the sovereign to have that reputation or to seek it is dangerous.18 
Therefore, there seem to be two types of magnanimity. There is what we 
could call the true magnanimity, the type that leads the man to distain both lit­
tle helps and injustice. But there is also another type, perhaps a false magna­
nimity that might even inspire injustice. The distinction between the true and 
the false is not fair because Hobbes never made such a distinction himself. He 
treated both as magnanimity, perhaps for good reason.19 How could one judge 
between an action produced by a magnanimous contempt of little helps and 
an action merely intended to look as if it were produced by the same? In many 
cases they would be the same act. Hobbes did not want the state to look into 
men's hearts, nor did he intend to produce a political science which relied on 
accomplishing that impossible task.20 
At best we could say that Hobbes was ambivalent about magnanimity. But 
this is not strong enough. According to Leo Strauss, Hobbes uniquely makes 
the claim in Leviathan that magnanimity is the origin of all virtue. Strauss at­
tributes this position that Hobbes took only temporarily to the influence of 
Descartes. Rather, "[f]or Hobbes, except when confused by his own real in­
tentions by Descartes, sees the origin of virtue not in magnanimity, but in fear, 
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in fear of violent death. He considers not magnanimity but fear of violent 
death as the only adequate self-consciousness."21 While he might have pre­
ferred a world or a commonwealth which could rely upon magnanimous men, 
relying upon such virtues where they can so easily be feigned was the under­
lying fault of previous attempts to provide political peace. Hobbes would not 
allow himself to indulge these fantasies. "Precisely because magnanimity is a 
form of pride, even though it be the most 'honorable' form, it cannot be ac­
cepted by Hobbes as the origin of justice."22 He dedicated Leviathan to Fran­
cis Godolphin, but he could not expect an entire commonwealth to be popu­
lated by men such as he. 
According to Hobbes, the laws of nature are contrary to our natural pas­
sions and the terror of some power is needed to compel us to abide by them.-3 
In the context of our concerns here, certainly the one law ol nature that is con­
trary t o the passions associated with magnanimity is the ninth, against pride. 
It is here where Hobbes takes a shot at Aristotle for assuming that a natural 
inequality permitted some to rule over others. Hobbes would have none of 
this. Accordingly he argued, "If Nature therefore have made men equall; that 
equalitie is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men unequal!; yet be­
cause men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions ol 
Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted."24 Whether 
or not men are equal by nature, by the laws of nature they must pretend that 
all are equal, for without such pretense no one will enter the contracts that 
produce peace. This is not quite the irony that Aristotle so approved of in the 
magnanimous man, but neither is it quite statesmanship.-5 
The power of the sovereign is designed to compel us to obey the laws we 
authorized him to make. Therefore, one might think that Hobbes's philosophy 
had an important place for statesmanship. The overwhelming role of the sov­
ereign within the commonwealth would normally suggest this. However, as 1 
have already pointed out, the term does not appear anywhere it might be ex­
pected. In general terms, how would statesmanship as we normally under­
stand it fit into Hobbes's political philosophy? 
Because Hobbes did not define statesmanship nor even discuss it in 
Leviathan or his other treatises, there are two possible places for us to look for 
it. We can look to his analysis of prudence or to his descriptions of civil sci­
ence. Prudence seems to be a logical place to find something like Hobbesian 
statesmanship, but it is disappointing. According to Hobbes, "To govern well 
a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different 
sorts of business."26 Prudence is not specific to affairs of state; rather, it is a 
general ability to predict future events based on the experience of similar 
events in the past27 It is not absolute, and it is certainly not scientific, but it 
can serve individuals well enough. In fact, it seems to serve individuals better 
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than groups. "A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own 
house," wrote Hobbes, "then a Privy Counseller in the affairs of another 
man."28 Prudence may be of some use in politics, but Hobbes sought some­
thing more certain. 
Hobbes's civil science, a science he characteristically thought first ap­
peared with his publication of De Give in 1642, was to be the place where 
such certainty could be found. Prudence, again, relies on comparing past 
events to current ones and extrapolating from that the likelihood of the same 
results occurring again. Hobbes's civil science relies on much surer methods. 
The Introduction to Leviathan ends thus: 
He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that par-
ticular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn 
any Language, or Science; yet, when I s hall have set down my own reading or­
derly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he 
also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other 
Demonstration.29 
We shall see below just how difficult it will be for Hobbes to restrict this civil 
science to the sovereign, and in what ways the subject must also understand 
some part of it. But for the moment it is important to see that what we might 
call statesmanship is neither a passion, like magnanimity, nor an intellectual 
virtue, like prudence. It is something different, it is something new; it is a sci­
ence.30 
Nevertheless, Hobbes cannot do without the statesman to the same degree 
that he thinks he can do without the magnanimous man. The virtues of the 
magnanimous man are rare and, he tells us, can not be relied upon for our 
safety precisely because of their rarity. The argument in Leviathan and other 
places, by contrast, seems to suggest that the qualities needed for a statesman 
can be taught, produced, or somehow developed through civil science. In a 
curious passage at the end of the second part of Leviathan, Hobbes writes "I 
am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the Common­
wealth of Plato.He regains his hope however when he considers how lit­
tle is required of the sovereign and his principal ministers, for he does not 
even ask them to master the mathematical sciences as Plato did. Instead, 
Hobbes ends this section by imagining a sovereign who would "by the exer­
cise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert 
this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice." Here it seems they 
need only teach it, or allow it to be taught; perhaps they do not even need to 
understand it fully. Whatever may be the case, Hobbes tried to move away 
from relying upon the virtues, whether moral or intellectual, and place more 
stress on science. 
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One thing that is starting to become apparent is that Hobbes treated magna­
nimity as a passion and downgraded its status as a moral virtue whereas he 
treated statesmanship, insofar as he did treat it a t all, as the product of his civil 
science and resembling a civil science. We shall see the significance of this dis­
tinction as magnanimity and statesmanship play out among the different roles 
of sovereign and subject. One fact remains constant, however. Hobbes did not 
want to rely upon magnanimity in any level of society lor the peace and tran­
quility of the state. This pushed him in the awkward direction of relying upon 
his new science in such a way that it would have to be somewhat widespread 
throughout the people in the commonwealth. These general considerations on 
magnanimity and statesmanship lead us to our more specific considerations of 
what role they play in the duties of both sovereign and subject. 
THE SOVERE IGN 
When it comes to the question of magnanimity and statesmanship the sover­
eign is certainly the most important figure. Both of these virtues would seem 
to apply to the sovereign far more than any subjects. But here it is important 
to remember what exactly the sovereign is and what role sovereignty plays in 
Hobbes's political philosophy. Power defines the position of the sovereign, 
for the sovereign is authorized to use the collective power of all the members 
of the Commonwealth.32 The sovereign is not a philosopher king, as Hobbes 
made clear in Leviathan.33 The sovereign's right to rule does not rest on his 
inherent qualities, but rather on the position he holds among the institutions 
of power. That is to say, the office is more important to Hobbes than is the of­
ficeholder. And we can see in several places that when Hobbes argued for the 
superior merits of monarchy he did not suggest that monarchs are morally su­
perior people. It is suspected that this argument, among others, accounts for 
the cool reception of Leviathan in the court of Charles II.34 
If magnanimity is the consciousness of power, all sovereigns ought to be mag­
nanimous as a matter of course. But what type of magnanimity? We can hope 
that they would distain injustice—if the sovereign can commit an injustice—but 
we know that magnanimity does not always work in that direction. It can easily 
slip into vainglory. And even when it does not this may still prove to be danger­
ous to the commonwealth. When we think of magnanimity as a contempt of lit­
tle hurts, might we not conclude that overlooking many small offenses against 
sovereignty can lead to much larger ones?35 
We know that diminishing the power of the sovereign is not good for the 
state.36 Rather, the virtue of the sovereign is to be found in retaining the con­
centration of power, not in adhering to some other concept of justice. For 
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Hobbes's whole point is that there can be no justice outside of the state, and 
there is no state without the centralization of power. So, however much the 
more positive aspects of magnanimity may appeal to us, Hobbes cannot be 
more than ambivalent about it. It is not consistently positive, it does not al­
ways lead to actions that promote peace. Hobbes cannot, therefore, endorse it 
as a virtue—or a passion —for sovereigns. 
Hobbes is well known for arguing that there is no real distinction between 
a tyrant and a sovereign, and that the very term tyrant merely means a 
"monarchy misliked."37 A statesman, therefore, may very well be no more 
than a sovereign who is liked. Thus tyranny and statesmanship can be dis­
missed by Hobbes as mere commentary rather than description. But as Kinch 
Hoekstra has explained, tyranny plays a complex role in Hobbes's work.38 
For instance, in De Cive Hobbes tells us that a king rules well and a tyrant 
does not.39 This is a very strong comment coming from Hobbes and it is not 
repeated elsewhere in his work. Nevertheless, we can find something akin to 
this same statement in Leviathan. Consider the argument in chapter 30. Al­
though entitled "Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative" it could as 
easily have been entitled "Of Statesmanship," for it is a fascinating instruc­
tion to sovereigns. Much of this chapter explains how and why the sovereign 
must justify his rights to his people and why he must execute those rights as 
he does. Hobbes explains, "and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so 
to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, 
against the danger that may arise to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Re­
bellion."40 In this sense, then, a tyrant does rule poorly for he has not suffi­
ciently explained himself to his people. Thus, a poorly instructed people will 
consider the legitimate actions of a sovereign to be acts of hostility, "which 
when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of 
Hostility, to avoyd."41 
Hobbes opens the chapter by explaining that the safety of the people to 
which the sovereign is bound by the very purpose of his institution means that 
he must do much more than simply keep them alive. "But by Safety here," he 
explains, "is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments 
of life, which every man by lawful Industry, without danger, or hurt to the 
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe."42 This rather expansive under­
standing of safety leads Hobbes to list among the duties of a sovereign not 
only the equal application of justice or equality of all subjects before the law, 
but even such policies as a Hat tax or sales tax, and the replacement of private 
charity with state welfare. This is also the chapter in which he famously rec­
ommended a reform of the universities for, "the Instruction of the people, de-
pendeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities."43 The idea 
running throughout this chapter is that a sovereign who does not rule well or 
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rather, who is not believed to rule well, will be accused of tyranny. But it 
seems that, however much Hobbes objected to the political and partisan uses 
to which the term tyrant could be put, he could find some justification lor ap­
plying it to those sovereigns who provoked their people into rebellion or who 
never explained the legitimacy of their actions. He wrote: "I conclude there­
fore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are 
the Naturall, and Fundamental Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, 
(whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own 
fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Com­
mon-wealth."44 So long as the sovereign does his duty and retains his full 
rights, he can easily teach the people to respect those rights and, thus, he can 
continue to retain them. 
There is one other argument that runs through chapter 30 of Leviathan, and 
it is that the interest of the sovereign is the same as that of his people. Hobbes 
writes, "For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is 
a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose sover­
eign wanteth Power to rule them at his will."45 Hobbes uses this same argu­
ment elsewhere to argue for the superiority of monarchy over both aristocracy 
and democracy, so it cannot be dismissed as an idle point.46 But in the con­
text of this chapter it should also be understood as an instruction to sovereigns 
who might otherwise overlook it. This second argument in the chapter, there­
fore, might be understood as complementary to the first. Whereas the first ar­
gument instructs the sovereign in the importance of how he is perceived by 
the people, this second argument instructs him in how he should perceive 
them. In other words, neither party should see the other as an enemy but as a 
partner in the common enterprise of procuring safety for all involved, safety 
in its most broad understanding. Conveniently, of course, it is the duty and in 
the interest of everyone that this be accomplished. 
The sovereign was not expected to act upon the virtue of prudence, but 
upon the wisdom of Hobbes's science. Prudence extrapolates from past 
events to predict future ones, so that "The best Prophet naturally is the best 
guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the mat­
ters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guess by."47 But Hobbes was not 
in the business of guessing; that was not good enough for him. And certainly 
the sovereign had to do better than simply guess at policy, so the virtue of pru­
dence had to be replaced with the science of politics. Magnanimity, being 
treated as the opposite, that is as a passion, plays much less of a role in the 
duty of a sovereign. But all of this accords very well with the suboptimal ac­
count that Hobbes presents in Leviathan and his other books. He was writing 
about the duties attendant to sovereignty, not its perfection. Surely Hobbes 
would have been very pleased with a sovereign who was magnanimous in 
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only the best sense and a true statesman. But could he expect such a figure to 
rise but rarely? He was not going to entrust public safety to fortune, any more 
than to guesswork. 
TH E SUBJ ECT 
Hobbes wrote in De Homine that "whatsoever the laws are, not to violate 
them is always and everywhere held to be a virtue in citizens, and to neglect 
them is held to be a vice."48 That says about all that needs to be said on the 
topic of magnanimity and statesmanship on the part of a subject. At least it 
would say everything, if it were not for the unfortunate fact that subjects of­
ten do not obey the laws and that a good deal of Hobbes's work was an at­
tempt to explain why they should. So we must take a bit more time with this 
topic. 
One of the most intriguing and often difficult parts of Hobbes's argument 
in the Leviathan is that the subjects form the commonwealth through an 
agreement with one another that includes the sovereign only tangentially.49 
This at least is the argument regarding a commonwealth by institution. And 
even though the commonwealth by acquisition is, of course, different, 
Hobbes tried to take the commonwealth by institution as the paradigmatic 
case. He may not be entirely successful in this attempt, and it may be true that 
acquisition better fits both the historical record and his own explanation.50 
Nevertheless, it is important to focus upon the commonwealth by institution 
when considering the duties of the subject because it is the formation of this 
commonwealth that best explains those duties as more than submission. As 
Hobbes well knew, if there is something approaching a moral reason for 
forming a commonwealth, and concomitant moral duties, they are to be found 
in this account of civil society. 
The first duty of the subject when forming a commonwealth is to confer his 
power onto another.51 In fact, Hobbes can say that the act of creation and the 
thing itself are one and the same. For authorizing another to take actions on 
one's behalf both creates the commonwealth and defines it and, at least in 
Leviathan, the soon-to-be-sovereign plays no role in this process. Through 
this act of creation the individual becomes a subject by alienating his own 
power (with certain exceptions)52 to the sovereign, as do all the others. Re­
linquishing power defines the subject, so any act that recovers some of it will 
be an act of usurpation. Here we see that magnanimity, in all but its most be­
nign sense, is incompatible with the duties of the subject. As either a display 
of power or a means of acquiring it, magnanimity threatens the monopoly of 
power that, Hobbes argued, is the key to securing peace. 
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Thus the passion of magnanimity is not good for the commonwealth. For 
even in those cases where it arises from salutary motives or a true moral 
virtue, it tends to be admired as a sign of power: "Reputation ot power, is 
Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerence oi those that need protec­
tion."53 And whereas having subjects who disdain to commit injustice might 
be a good thing for the commonwealth, magnanimity is too ambiguous a 
virtue to trust. Subjects who wield power on their own threaten the peace be­
cause the laws cease to bind them effectively. He wrote that "laws are as cob­
webs to potent men."54 Anything that loosens the bonds of the law moves in 
the direction of returning men to the state of nature. Nevertheless, Hobbes did 
claim that a sovereign who is popular and beloved of his people has nothing 
to fear from the popularity of any of his subjects. For such a sovereign relies 
not only on the good opinion in which he is held but also on the very office 
of sovereignty which a usurper does not have.55 There is no contradiction 
here. Hobbes was thinking of the best possible case where a sovereign un­
derstands his role, explains it to his people, and all submit to his rule. In the 
suboptimal condition which he takes to be the normal one, however, power­
ful subjects are a cause for concern. 
At first glance it would seem that statesmanship is by definition an en­
croachment on the rights of sovereignty. Wisdom or insight into the affairs ot 
state are not the proper concern of subjects. There are many passages in 
Hobbes's work that bear this out. He tells us that subjects should not compare 
their laws with the laws of other states and that they should not seek reform. 
In Leviathan, he unfavorably compared human society to that of bees on 
many points. One stands out in this context: 
Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, 
nor think they sec any fault, in the administration of their common busincsse: 
whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and 
abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and 
innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction 
and Civill warre.56 
In De Cive he made the point with force: "every king, whether good or bad, 
is exposed to being condemned by the judgment, and having his throat cut by 
the hand, of a lone assassin."57 As Harvey Mansfield has put it, For Hobbes, 
then, consent is not a kind of participation in politics; it is, to the contrary, as 
far as possible an abstention from politics."58 Excluding the subjects from 
politics is not that simple, however. Subjects will not spontaneously obey the 
laws, and they will certainly not know why they ought to obey the laws un­
less someone tells them. Some amount of understanding, some access to his 
civil science, is required of subjects for the state to be successful. 
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This leads to a tension in Hobbes's political philosophy. He wanted his 
book to be taught in the schools and then those lessons to be transferred to the 
people through other means. In a most colorful passage, he wrote: 
For seeing the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from 
whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to 
sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) upon the Peo­
ple, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the 
Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits.51' 
Thus, on the one hand, his argument required that all the subjects of the com­
monwealth learn their duties and the justifications for the rights of the sover­
eign. He even placed subjects in the awkward position of rejecting powers 
that they might be granted when they understand that, instead, they ought to 
be retained by the sovereign.60 This places a burden on the subject to under­
stand the science of politics. Yet, on the other hand, these same subjects must 
not look too deeply into political questions or compare their own laws with 
the laws of others. For example, Hobbes is frank in admitting that "there is 
scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience 
be justified."61 Opening-up political questions would both encroach on the 
rights of the sovereign and stir up discontent. How do you teach people to 
learn only so much?62 
Hobbes divided the population of each commonwealth into two groups: the 
first has little time or interest in discussing or discovering the principles of 
natural justice; the second forms the opinions of the first group based upon 
the little bit they studied in the universities. The first group he described as 
they "whom necessity, or covetousenesse keepeth attent on their trades, and 
labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth afther 
their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of 
Mankind)."63 This first group was not distinguished as an economic class, for 
it included both rich and poor (as did the second group). Rather, it was a class 
of people too poor, greedy, or hedonistic to devote any time to studying. And 
this is the vast majority of humanity. Yet these were the same people Hobbes 
thought had to have just enough of his civil science to know what to do. Per­
haps their general distraction or indifference to such studies makes irrelevant 
any concern about them going too far. But it does not solve the problem ot 
getting them up to the minimum standard, even if they are more easy to in­
struct than are the rich and potent subjects.64 
Magnanimity, a passion, is not demanded of the subject and its vices are 
certainly discouraged. It is more difficult to understand the place of states­
manship, however. Some civil science is required, but only a certain amount. 
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Too much or too little understanding of politics on the part of the subject im­
perils the state. It is a difficult balance to achieve, and Hobbes did not provide 
a great deal of advice on how to strike it. Presumably that is the job of the 
sovereign as statesman. 
CONCLUSION 
Hobbes described the commonwealth as an artificial person, and in the Intro­
duction to the Leviathan he set out in detail a comparison ol all the parts of the 
human body and all the parts of the state. Ought we, then, to ask if this artificial 
man might not have the virtues of magnanimity and statesmanship? There is no 
place in his description of the Leviathan for the passion of magnanimity. Hobbes 
tells us that voluntary motion and the passions arise from imagination,65 to which 
nothing corresponds in his analogy. This should come as no surprise, for institu­
tions have no passions; that, it would seem, is their great advantage. By contrast, 
if the intellectual virtue of statesmanship as either prudence or civil science 
might be assigned to the faculty of reason in the individual, it has its correspon­
ding feature in the state under the heading of "equity." Even if equity does not 
exhaust the classical understanding of statesmanship, it certainly captures a great 
deal of what Hobbes would have understood by it.66 
Hobbes could largely do without magnanimity because he thought he need 
not rely on this passion. Statesmanship, however, was much harder for him to 
abandon. The problem Hobbes faced is that a sovereign could make mistakes 
that would endanger the commonwealth. Institutions alone could not solve 
this problem, which is why Hobbes offered very little by way of institutional 
solutions.67 Neither could he rely on the virtues of mere men, like the broth­
ers Godolphin, to achieve any more than they had in the past. His promise of 
the true civil science had to take him beyond that. And yet, however much 
Hobbes tried to insulate the state from the vagaries and inconsistencies of the 
human element, they always returned on him. 
As a second best solution to fundamental political problems, Hobbes's plans 
have much to recommend them. Many subsequent authors have recreated some 
of his solutions.68 But as his law of equality makes especially clear, much of his 
solution is based upon a fiction or a pretense. To the extent that magnanimity can 
be dismissed as a passion and statesmanship subsumed by his civil science, it 
might just work. But we know that magnanimity may be based on a reasonable 
assessment of one's abilities, and Hobbes admitted that intellectual virtues were 
required to implement his science. He might be able to distract us from magna­
nimity and statesmanship, but he cannot eliminate them from politics. In this 
1 Iobbes was right in describing sovereignty in the artificial person as an artificial 
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soul: without the virtues of magnanimity and statesmanship to accompany it, 
such sovereignty is no more than a very thin body.69 
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